dynamic effect, we will take a closer look at both types of effects in this section. 8 
Route Network Structure
Under a regulated system, like in the US before 1978, airlines may often have to operate a point-to-point network because of route restrictions. As a result of airline deregulation, however, all the major US carriers developed a socalled 'hub-and-spoke' network. Most city pairs are no longer serviced directly, but passengers are flown to the centre ('hub') of a starshaped network first, and then take a connecting flight to their destination. This crucial shift in operations can be explained in terms of cost considerations and demand conditions (Morrison and Winston, 1985) . 9 Some intuition of the economic motivation for such route restructuring can be obtained using a very simple model.
Consider the three point network in figure 1 . Under regulation, a designated carrier has the right to fly passengers from point to point in the network 10 . For simplicity of exposition, suppose each point in the network has the same, constant demand for air transport to each of the other points in the network, say α per day. In the regulated situation, an airline may meet this demand by operating six direct flights per day, as indicated by the arrows.
If the industry is deregulated and the airline is allowed to fly passengers on any route in the network, it may consider operating a hub-and -spoke (HS) network in stead of the current 8 It is fair to say that the route structure effect is less important in Europe. One must assume that, given the low profit levels before deregulation, the extra revenues caused by protective regulation were absorbed by high input costs c.q. low productivity.
9
A further explanation of the phenomenon based on strategic behaviour by airlines is made by Berechman et al. (1994) . We will not make use of their results here. 10 This may, for example, illustrate a situation where an airline from country A has third and fourth freedom rights on the AB and AC routes, fifth freedom rights on BC, but no sixth freedom rights to fly BC passengers via A. fully connected (FC) network; assuming that A is the hub located in the home country, this would mean discontinuing the direct connection BC, and flying these passengers through A.
What would be the advantages of such a change in operations? Firstly, there are cost considerations. Assuming unchanged demand and a capacity of aircraft larger than or equal to 2α (i.e., the loadfactor under regulation was smaller than or equal to .50), the airline could simply cut the two BC flights per day and, with appreciably higher loadfactors, meet the same origin-destination transport demand. 11 Assuming no extra costs associated with the greater number of passengers to be handled at A, the airline saves the marginal costs of the two flights on the BC route market.
However, BC travelers may not like the extra time and effort needed for the detour via A. Therefore, the above cost savings have to be compared with a possible loss of demand.
In the words of Morrison and Winston (1985, p.59 Economies of scope are the cost savings due to the changed route structure, and depend on more efficient aircraft utilization (higher load factors in the example) or, otherwise, the economies associated with larger aircraft size. At the same time, the airline may use the saved capacity in order to increase frequency, and thereby attract extra travelers. 12 Revenue losses depend on travel time changes, frequency changes and the relevant demand elasticities.
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A number of extensions and complications may be added to the simple model outlined above.
Firstly, there are certain cost penalties associated with the operation of a HS network. Most importantly, passenger handling costs are higher, as connecting passengers board and disembark twice in stead of once. Also, the above model simply eliminates two flights:
however, when capacity restrictions are present and / or frequencies are increased to attract passengers, a HS network will generally involve more landings and take-offs, which 11 Likewise, assuming the airline disposes of a fleet consisting of varied aircraft size, it might achieve this schedule by reallocating aircraft over its network.
increases unit costs and landing charge expenses. Furthermore, in order to make the HS system work, flights from the various spokes have to meet at the hub at approximately the same time. The process involving a wave of arrivals followed shortly by a wave of departures is called a complex, and should take a minimum of transfer time. The peaks in activity experienced by hub airports ask for costly extra handling capacity. It has already been indicated, however, that cost savings occur due to improved aircraft utilization. In reality, this is likely to occur through economies of vehicle size: unit costs are a decreasing function of size.
Furthermore, gains on the demand side deserve some more attention. An airline operating a somewhat more elaborate network than the one in the example, is able to cause a dramatic increase in the number of city-pair markets operated by switching to a HS network:
if a hub has n links, the number of markets connected via the hub equals n(n-1)/2, so the number of services offered in a HS network is a quadratic function of the number of spokes.
One could say, given the number of links operated, a HS network maximizes the number of OD-markets served.
Finally, a remark should be made about hub-and-spoke networks as strategic advantages of incumbent carriers vis-a-vis potential entrants. As is argued by Berechman et al. (1994) , incumbents use hub-and-spoke networks as entry deterring instruments. Also, hub dominance enables carriers to charge higher prices and earning a monopoly rent on routes ending at the hub (Barrett 1992) . This line of reasoning helps to explain the twin development of HS networks on the one hand, and the highly oligopolistic character of the US airline industry on the other.
In conclusion, one should try to establish the overall effect on an airline's profit of switching from a FC to a HS network. Notwithstanding the extra costs associated with the operation of a HS network, the advantages are significant in terms of (a) more efficient capital / fleet utilization, (b) higher market share by offering increased frequency and more destinations, and (c) the strategic advantages of hub airport dominance. Evidence from the rigourously deregulated US airline industry, where in the period immediately after deregulation " ... huband-spoke routing has increased by about 50 percent" (Berechman et al. 1994, p.1) suggests that airlines' benefits of operating HS networks outweigh the costs. In practical terms, this suggests that airline deregulation will induce shorter routes, higher frequencies, probably larger aircraft sizes and more intense peak traffic at airports; also, hub dominance may confer monopolistic power to incumbent carriers.
Pricing and Market Structure
In this section, we will disregard the operational changes outlined above, and compare the (static) effects of deregulation on competition in a given market. Making a few simple assumptions on behaviour under the respective regulatory regimes, economic theory suggests a number of straightforward results regarding the market equilibrium under deregulation.
Given that deregulation liberalizes pricing and entry, one of those results and indeed one of the expectations and goals of deregulation (e.g. Kahn, 1988) , is a decline in fares due to (more intense) competition.
Such a decline in (average) fares has been shown theoretically by Dresner and Tretheway (1992) . They distinguish between (traditional) regulated bilateral agreements, under which prices were fixed by governmental authority, and competitive or liberal agreements. They assume that under the former, carriers collude and fix prices so as to maximize joint profits. Dresner and Tretheway assume duopolists to display Bertrand pricing behaviour, implying that price competition leads to marginal cost pricing; thus, it can easily be shown that prices will decrease after deregulation. It should, however, be noted that the Bertrand model with its marginal cost pricing and zero profit outcome, is not completely satisfactory; in the airline industry as in other industries, duopolists are observed to earn positive profits. This socalled Bertrand paradox can be solved theoretically in a number of ways (Tirole 1988). One can introduce longer time horizon than the 'one-shot-game' setting of the model, i.e., carriers do not engage in price wars because short-run gains are offset by profits foregone in the longer run. Also, if consumers do not view competitors' products as perfect sustitutes, price competition is relaxed. Finally, even when consumers do not differentiate between the seats of two competing airlines, one can solve the paradox by introducing capacity constraints. In a multiperiod variant of the Edgeworth model, Dudey (1992) shows that when one of the duopolists has capacity less than market demand, and the other has capacity at least equal to market demand, the optimal strategy for the second duopolist is to let the other sell out first, and after that charge the profit maximizing price to the rest of the market. If the second duopolist would not do so, price competition would lead to zero profits for both firms. Together with the presence of a certain degree of product differentiation, this may explain the absence of price wars and marginal cost pricing in a number of airline markets.
Another way to deal with the strong assumptions underlying the basic oligopoly models is to empirically estimate measures of competitive behaviour (known as conduct parameters or conjectural variations) in deregulated airline markets using a more general model (Brander and Zhang, 1990; Oum et al., 1993) . The latter study shows that for duopoly markets of American Airlines and United Airlines, the conduct parameters are lower (airlines behave more competitively) as distances rise, as the combined market share declines and as more fringe competitiors are present. One conclusion is that airlines adjust their pricing strategies to competitive conditions in each route market. The above studies, however, also show that the conduct parameters for these duopolists are, on average, much closer to zero (Cournot behaviour) than to minus one (competitive pricing). We may conclude that there are both theoretical and empirical arguments rejecting the hypothesis of competitive, that is, marginal cost pricing. However, theory and empirical evidence show that average fares have decreased as a result of deregulation.
A closely related question is whether entry took place. Even if the above models show oligopoly pricing above competitive levels, theory predicts prices to decline as new firms enter the market (Martin, 1993) . Entry is likely to occur when the potential entrant expects positive returns to his investment; we may therefore assume that entry will occur if there are positive profits in the industry, the entrant is likely to obtain a certain share of the market and the sunk costs are not 'too' high.
The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed: whereas capacity greatly increased immediately after liberalization in a number of cases (e.g. on many US domestic routes and the North Atlantic), reconcentration in the medium term has been widespread.
14 For Europe, the situation is different: as Doganis (1994) Secondly, entry entails costs of communicating complex information and of establishing reputation, which are characterized by economies of scale and scope.
Furthermore, travel agencies sell tickets for the entire US air travel system through a few computer reservation systems (CRS) 16 , which are owned by only a few airlines who can use it to supply biassed information in their favour. Access to these systems for entrants is very costly. Ground handling monopolies have the same effect.
Apart from these 'structural' barriers to contestability, strategic barriers can be distinguished, viz., anticompetitive mergers and pricing policy (Barrett 1992; Doganis 1994).
14 This has been called the most unpleasant surprise of airline deregulation by Kahn (1988) .
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For a discussion of the 'theory of contestable markets' in the context of US airline deregulation, see Martin (1993, 315-319) .
Mergers reduce the possibility of price competition, by eliminating the number of independent suppliers in markets. Morrison and Winston (1989) and Borenstein (1990) report significantly higher prices as a result of mergers; in the absence of other competitors, mergers may result in price increases over 12%. 17 The use of pricing policy as a strategic instrument may result in collusive pricing in uncontested, oligopolistic markets (although the evidence shown above rejects such a cartel hypothesis), and in the possibility of predatory pricing in markets that are contested. Without testing empirically all the above barriers to contestability here, the literature suggests that they are quite substantial and indeed confer market power to airlines.
The overall conclusion on pricing and market structure reads that deregulation brought considerable benefits to consumers by lowering average real fares, while remaining entry barriers allow carriers to keep prices above competitive levels in oligopolistic markets.
Without going into the size of the specific demand elasticities, this does suggest a positive effect on demand for air transport.
Environmental effects of deregulation.
Particular features of environmental problems caused by aviation are that the sources are mobile so that they cannot be simply attached to a particular location or even a country, and that the altitude of the emission influences the dispersion pattern.
Aviation has environmental effects at various scales. Some of them are local and concern noise near airports and emissions of pollutants by aircraft while being at airports or during the landing and take-off cycle. Among these emissions are those of VOC due to fuelling of aircraft and fuel handling in general, and CO emissions of aircraft while being in the idle and taxi mode due to incomplete combustion. For these pollutants the shares emitted at altitudes lower than 1.5 km are dominant (50 to 80%). For other pollutants such as NO x 17 However, Morrison and Winston (1989) evaluate total welfare effects of mergers, including e.g. decreased travel time, and conclude that half of the mergers reduce travelers' welfare, while half of the mergers result in an increase. and SO 2 these shares are clearly lower (20 to 40%).
At a larger spatial scale (regional/national/continental) are emissions due to climbing/approaching and cruising. These emissions take place in the forms of CO 2 , NO x , SO 2 , CH, CO, VOC and other polluting gases.
At a global scale emissions are important that take place in the stratosphere (the layer above about 12 km where also the Ozone layer is located). Since most aircraft has cruise levels at about 10 to 12 km (not far away from the stratosphere), a non-negligible part of the aircraft effluents is indeed emitted in the stratosphere (cf. Olivier, 1991). Table 2 gives an impression of current emission levels due to aviation. The largest contributions in this table concern CO 2 and NO x . Although the present shares are limited, one must be aware that aviation is among the sectors in the world with a high growth rate (more than 5% at an annual basis). This means that the aviation share of emissions tends to increase. Source: Fransen and Peper (1993).
As explained in the preceding sections, deregulation may have far-reaching effects on the volume and structure of operations of the airline industry. Hence, it will also influence the environmental impacts of aviation. An important consideration in this respect is that aviation due to its international character has a rather privileged position in terms of taxation. Not only do international airports and airlines benefit from tax free shopping facilities, but especially the fact that value added taxes on international airline tickets and excise taxes on kerosine for international flights are zero leads to an absence of financial incentives to correct for air traffic externalities. Thus, where welfare gains may be expected from a deregulation of aviation (section 4), there is also the danger of the generation of excessive external costs.
The effects of deregulation on emissions take place in various ways. First, the increase in the level of competition has a depressing impact on fares. Since the price elasticity of demand for air traffic is substantial, this will also have a substantial effect on the volume of traffic. This clearly has an unfavourable effect on overall emissions.
Next, a more competitive environment for the aviation industry will lead to a stronger drive for improvement of fuel efficiency. Efforts to improve fuel efficiency will reduce emissions of CO 2 and possibly also of other gases. However, there may also be conflicts between improving energy efficiency and reducing environmental damage. For example, Somerville (1993) notes that the very technology that has led to improvements in fuel efficiency leads to increased NO x emissions. Where the drive for cost reductions induced by deregulation leads to higher load factors, there are certainly gains to be expected in terms of emissions per passenger kilometre.
Concerning the environmental effects of the introduction of hub and spoke structures, we will formulate a simple linear relationship. Let E be the volume of emissions, D the distance between two airports, Q the maximum capacity of a plane, and q the actual number of passengers (q<Q). We distinguish two regimes:
1. approaching, landing, taxiing, being idle, take-off, climbing, and 2. cruising. 18 This is obviously a simplified specification. For example, since more fuel has to be taken in the case of long distance trips, this will increase the weight of the aircraft and hence the CO 2 emissions both during take-off and cruising. Thus we would arrive at a non-linear form where coefficients would depend on the distance of a trip. 19 Also for the cost function non-linear forms could be proposed but we give priority to a simple presentation.
burden implied by the cost functions presented above is not evenly spread in space. More in particular, the local effects produced during regime 1 are concentrated in areas near airports.
The transition from FC to HS in case 0 leads to an improvement for the non-hub airports, while the situation in the hub airport (slightly) deteriorates. In a similar fashion we find for case 1 that the local environmental situation worsens in the hub and remains the same in the non-hub airports as a consequence of the transition from the FC to the HS 1 network. With the HS 2 solution the situation in the hub would deteriorate and in the non-hub airports it would improve. Thus, a general tendency can be observed that the environmental situation in the hub deteriorates relative to the situation in the other airports as a consequence of the introduction of hub and spoke networks.
We finish this section by pointing at two interesting topics as subjects for further research. The first topic concerns local airport taxes as an instrument to correct for air transport externalities; an issue is to what extent such taxes will discourage the emergence of extremely dominant hub airports.
The second topic concerns the possibility that regions around hub airports receive a compensation for the negative environmental externality in the form of a positive externality: a high level of international accessibility leading to the location of internationally oriented economic activities such as corporate headquarters, distribution centres, and offices of international organizations.
Conclusions.
Deregulation in the US airline sector has had a strong impact on fares, network structures, and the level of concentration. The overall conclusion reads that in the US consumer welfare has increased owing to the decrease in fares and the increases in frequencies. However, since the airline market is not perfectly contestable after the deregulation, there remains scope for oligopolistic profits. For the European airline sector similar results may be expected, but effects on network structures will probably be smaller because all major European airlines do already operate hub and spoke networks. Nevertheless, deregulation may lead to a shift into the direction of a smaller number of major hubs associated with a small number of dominating airlines.
An important aspect of deregulation which has not received much attention in the literature concerns the external costs. These costs are especially important since, in contrast with other transport modes, the use of Pigovian taxes in aviation has been very limited up to now 20
. Major effects of deregulation on the environment would be a decrease of fares (stimulating an increase in traffic volumes which is unfavourable for the environment) and an increase of load factors (leading to a higher efficiency in fuel use and thus also in CO 2 emissions per traveller kilometre). In the paper we also address a number of issues related to the effects of the introduction of hub and spoke networks on the environment. The question whether this effect is favourable appears to depend on a good number of coefficients, but there is some reason to believe that the effect is favourable for most types of pollutants as long as we may assume that the total number of trips remains constant. However, in terms of equity an unfavourable development takes place for hub airports where local environmental conditions worsen relative to the situation in non-hub airports. 20 An investigation of the environmental impacts of taxes on kerosine use is given by Olivier (1995) .
